



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Cuba

cc: Mr. Schlesinger

OCT 2 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Paper on Cuba for the
Vice President

In response to a request by Mr. Carl Kaysen to Assistant Secretary Martin, enclosed is a paper prepared in the Department which lists possible questions relating to the Cuban situation and provides suggested replies. Mr. Martin has an appointment to brief the Vice President on Wednesday, October 3, on the Cuban situation and will speak along these same general lines.

/s/ E. S. Little

for
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Briefing paper on Cuba.

NOTES ON CUBAN ISSUES FOR VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON

1. I do not propose to review the available facts on the build up in Cuba. These have been covered in the President's statements, copies of which are attached.

2. How can we be sure that this equipment is defensive and how will we know if an offensive capability is established?

The distinction between an offensive and defensive capability is not one which can be applied to individual weapons, almost any one of which can be used offensively. It has to do with the complex of available military power. It is a matter on which military men can make a reasonable judgment on the basis of known facts. In the case of Cuba, for example, an offensive capability would have to involve one or more of the following:

(a) A way to get substantial numbers of troops from here to there -- namely, ships capable of taking troops from Cuba and landing them on a foreign shore against some opposition.

(b) An air striking force capable of penetrating defensive measures.

(c) Ground-to-ground missiles with a range permitting them to attack major areas of the continent.

One might also class as offensive the establishment of base complexes which would permit Soviet forces, as distinct from Cubans, to operate in strength from Cuban territory, or the build up of substantial Soviet bloc combat forces in Cuba.

All of these contingencies are foreseen in the Presidential statements as to the measures which would raise "grave issues" and imply some form of United States action.

It should always be clear that we are well informed about military developments in Cuba, and will know when any of these developments are underway.

Contrary to some reports the present SA-2 anti-aircraft missile bases cannot be converted in a short period of time

to

to ground-to-ground IRBM bases. This would take completely new equipment and a number of months of work which could not be concealed.

It may also be worth noting with respect to the Soviet presence in Cuba, five other points:

(a) That in terms of numbers of Soviet bloc and Cuban military personnel and their equipment, there is no military threat to US.

(b) That the US still has more than ample power to prevent any aggressive military action against any Latin American country and has committed itself to use it if necessary.

(c) That the additional equipment now in Cuba or on the way adds very little to the difficulty of successful military operations against the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba if their further actions should indicate that this is required.

(d) That this is not the start of Soviet assistance to Cuba. Nearly \$100 million of equipment was delivered in the 1960-1961 period, mostly conventional ground equipment, plus MIG aircraft.

(e) That the Soviet presence with military equipment in Cuba not only is no military threat to the US but is not the beginning of a possible Soviet threat to US security -- this was achieved some years ago when the Soviets secured a reasonably accurate ICBM with nuclear warheads and submarines with nuclear missiles and with ranges reaching to the US coastline.

3. Isn't the recent agreement between the Soviets and the Cubans for constructing a modern fishing port capable of serving the Cuban and Soviet Atlantic fishing fleets a threatening military development?

It is undoubtedly true that port facilities could be provided which would have value to the Soviets well beyond the needs of a fishing fleet alone. So far, since construction has not been started, we cannot know what the real intention is. But you may be sure that by the time it is completed we will know what its capability is and what it's being used for and will shape our policies accordingly.

4. Why would the Soviets want to raise all this fuss in US-Soviet relations at this time by taking steps which they must have known would excite US hostility?

While one can never know for sure what motivates another person, least of all a Russian, the available evidence suggests strongly that this crash build up of military and economic assistance did not represent a Soviet initiative but rather a response to insistent demands from Castro for help. Sometime last spring Castro must have seen that his difficult economic situation was causing unrest in Cuba and seriously hampering his subversive activities in Latin America. He apparently feared that the United States might take advantage of these internal difficulties to invade Cuba. In any case a major addition to his defenses would both impress Cubans with the supposed reality of the threat of invasion and reassure his supporters that defense was possible. His position would thus be bolstered until expanded Soviet economic aid and technical advice got his economy going up again.

The Soviet Union was undoubtedly most reluctant to see the Cuban regime get into deep trouble. The association was already close enough for the overthrow of Castro to be interpreted globally as a major Soviet reversal. Probably more important, Cuba was a major asset to the Soviet Union in its long term and massive effort to convert other Latin American countries to Communism. Therefore Castro's position must be supported or at least prevented from deteriorating and at least his minimum demands met.

This was perhaps not an easy decision for Mr. K. His economic position is under pressure from many quarters and further demands from Cuba could hardly be welcome. The Soviet military must have known as clearly as our own that what they were providing in terms of defensive equipment really added very little to Castro's ability to withstand determined US defensive military action. The Soviets have had enough experience in Latin America to be aware that this further dramatic identification of Castro with the Soviet bloc could only damage their program of subversion by alienating fellow travelers and liberals who still saw Castro as a Latin revolutionist or agrarian reformer, rather than an agent of Soviet imperialism and by further alerting and consolidating the opposition of truly democratic sectors of the population.

This

This analysis of Soviet motives and objectives is an important guide to US policy for in the context of the global struggle, such as we are now engaged in with the Soviet bloc, the essential issue with respect to Cuba is not Cuba itself but Cuba as an aid to Soviet objectives.

From this standpoint it seems clear that, while the recent Soviet moves have been defensive from a military standpoint, they do represent an effort to maintain, if not improve, the ability of the Soviet bloc to utilize Cuba to act offensively in the subversive field against the governments of Latin America.

It, therefore, must be the aim of US policy and that of our friends in the Hemisphere to do everything we can to demonstrate to the Soviets that their investment in Cuba will not pay off. This can be done by rigorous measures which isolate Cuba from the rest of the Hemisphere, by vigorous action against Castro's Communist agents and collaborators within the countries of Latin America and by continued active promotion of the Alliance for Progress as the free world's answer to the problems of the peoples of Latin America.

At the same time that we attempt to minimize the value of Cuba to the Soviet Union, we wish also to do what we can to increase its cost to them. This is the reason for seeking cooperation from other free world countries in Latin America and elsewhere in connection with trade and shipping questions.

5. Isn't it intolerable that our NATO allies, for whom we have done so much, should permit their ships to help the Soviets supply Cuba with the things Cuba needs, including military equipment?

The US Government has been unable to produce a single bit of evidence that any free world ship on charter to the Soviet bloc has carried military equipment or supplies from the Soviet bloc to Cuba. Nor are any of our free world friends selling military equipment or supplies themselves to Cuba.

In fact the Soviets are, of course, extraordinarily secretive about military matters and it seems highly unlikely that they would ever agree to the shipment of military equipment in vessels manned by other than Soviet bloc crews as are all those now under charter to the bloc.

The

The free world ships which have been chartered to the Soviet bloc for use in Cuban trade have been engaged primarily in carrying such things as oil, fertilizers, machinery and equipment and various types of consumer goods to Cuba and carrying sugar away from Cuba.

The general practice is to charter such ships with owners crews without specifying what routes they may be used on. To specify that they not be used on bloc routes to Cuba will cause the Soviets some complications but no serious damage as the Soviet bloc owns far more tonnage than is required to handle the totality of the Cuban trade.

It would, of course, be possible to refuse to charter any vessels to the Soviet bloc for any trade routes whatever. This would be seriously embarrassing to their trade until they had completed the massive ship building program which they would undoubtedly undertake. It would be extremely difficult to secure cooperation from all free world countries to such an embargo, particularly in view of the great surplus of shipping which currently exists in the world. It would be hard to persuade companies or countries that the provision of ship services was essentially different in character from the provision of goods of a wide variety of types which is currently accepted as part of our trading relationships with the bloc.

6. Is there still such a thing as the Monroe Doctrine or have we thrown it on the scrap heap?

The Monroe Doctrine states a conclusion, namely that the incursion of a European power into the hemisphere constitutes a "danger to the peace and security of this nation." It does not specify the action to be taken in the face of a particular situation and in fact the actions that have been taken over the 140 years since it was announced have varied widely. Implementation of any principle must depend upon judgments embracing all the current circumstances and factors in the situation in relation to the fundamental security interests of the United States, which the conclusion or principle is of course, intended to reflect.

7. It is true that the Monroe Doctrine, starting in 1939 with the Inter-American Conference at Havana, has been made part of the doctrine of the Inter-American system. But this in no way makes it any less a United States doctrine to be applied in relation to US security interests. The multi-lateralizing of the Doctrine provides an alternative channel

for

for taking whatever actions appear appropriate to make it effective. It in no way limits our own ability to take those actions which are essential to our own national security on a unilateral basis.

The actions of the US Government from 1960 on have reflected a recognition of the fact that the Castro Communist regime in Cuba was a danger to the peace and security of the US and the hemisphere, though thus far this danger has not seemed in our best judgment to be of a character which warranted military action.

7. What have we in fact done about the Marxist-Leninist incursion into Cuba and thereby into this hemisphere?

Here are the major steps which have been taken:

(a) Diplomatic relations have been broken.

(b) All imports of goods into the US from Cuba or from other countries containing Cuban components have been stopped.

(c) Exports to Cuba have been limited to certain foods and medicines.

(d) The use of US registered vessels to carry military equipment and supplies and other strategic materials to Cuba has been forbidden.

(e) In agreement with our Inter-American friends, we have:

(i) Forbidden the export of military equipment and material to Cuba.

(ii) We have excluded Cuba from participating in all the organizations of the Inter-American system operating under the Organization of American States.

(iii) We have excluded Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board.

(iv) We have requested the COAS as the supreme body of the OAS in constant session, to maintain special vigilance and have established a Special Consultative Committee on Security to investigate and make recommendations for action at the request of any Latin American country on attempts by Cuba to subvert their governments by any means.

(v) In

(v) In precise terms we have declared a Marxist-Leninist government incompatible with all the hemisphere stands for and have identified Cuba unanimously as such a government.

(vi) Apart from these specific steps, we remain convinced that the welfare of the CAR's, as well as their best defense vs. the efforts of the Soviet bloc to subvert them to the doctrines of communism lies in strengthening the institutions of political and economic democracy in the hemisphere. We have therefore embarked, together with the CAR on the Alliance for Progress - a decade of development which offers the hope of bringing to the peoples of the hemisphere the equalization of economic benefits and the democratic institutions which are compatible with their individual dignity and which fulfill their basic needs.

(vii) We have maintained the closest surveillance from international waters and airspace of everything that goes into and out of Cuba.

(viii) We have undertaken a wide variety of bilateral measures with other Latin American countries to improve their capability to deal with Communist subversion.

(ix) We have welcomed tens of thousands of Cuban exiles to our shores, provided them with subsistence, helped them find jobs, welcomed them into our armed forces and given encouragement to them and the people of Cuba in their desire to restore free government in that country.

8. Why don't we invade Cuba and get it over with?

In the first place our best military judgment is that an invasion of Cuba would cost many American and Cuban lives. Even if there were no other reasons, this alone would make it necessary that we seek a solution to this problem not requiring the use of force, though always accepting that in the end force may be necessary, as the President has done.

In addition, under present circumstances, it would be exceedingly difficult to justify military action as consistent with the pattern of international law and relations which the US for many years has fought for, calling for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. We could be in serious difficulties not only in the United Nations but elsewhere. For with our pattern of alliances involving our relations with the Soviet Union, unilateral action by the

United States

United States against Cuba would inevitably complicate other aspects of our relations and those of our allies with the Soviets.

In fact we must realize that it is Soviet interest and prestige with which we are dealing in Cuba and not just Castro and the Cubans and, therefore, action of this sort with respect to Cuba can only be taken aftermost careful appraisal of probable Soviet reactions there and elsewhere around the world where we are in conflict.

If, as the President has said, United States security interests were to be directly and immediately threatened, then we would have to act, regardless of its complications elsewhere, but under present circumstances such risks are not justified.

9. Why not a peaceful blockade then?

There is really no such thing as a peaceful blockade. Whether it is peaceful or not depends upon what the other party decides. For generations the United States has pressed hard and in some cases fought for a concept of freedom of the seas which might at the most permit us to interfere with Cuban ships on the basis of a doctrine of equivalent reprisal without providing a basis for charges of illegal action. And, of course, stopping Cuban ships alone would accomplish almost nothing.

To be effective a blockade requires that we stop Soviet ships, by force if necessary. This would be an act of war. A blockade by the US could only be justified if we were prepared to make it effective even though that involved starting a military conflict.

This is not to say a blockade is excluded but that it is an appropriate instrument only in connection with new and different actions in Cuba or elsewhere which call for warlike measures. It, therefore, can be justified only where the use of military force could be defended.

10. Why don't we recognize a government in exile to which we could give military assistance and other support in regaining Cuba?

This is an idea which has many attractions but also raises many difficulties. There are over 200 Cuban exile groups and to find a government which could unite the

majority

majority of the exiles behind them would be an enormous practical task. Even if done, there is no prospect that Cubans alone could conduct a military operation against Cuba with our equipment and training help that would have a reasonable prospect of success under anything like present circumstances.'

There are also legal and practical difficulties about recognizing a government in exile based on the refugees and disregarding the Cubans in Cuba who are fighting Castro, thousands of whom are in jail. It has been US policy consistently to recognize governments in exile only when they have a direct connection with the last legally constituted government of the country, usually when they have actually exercised power in the country just prior to being forced out. This is a legal position which we would be reluctant to abandon.

But it would be even more coricous to give the people of Cuba who have stayed behind to fight Castro directly the idea that they have no role to play in determining how Cuba will be governed. In them must lie a major share of responsibility for returning Cuba to the free world.

There is a final legal point which is that while we have broken diplomatic relations with the present Cuban Government, we still recognize it as the Cuban Government and as such responsible for its international obligations, including protection of American citizens and recognition of our rights under the Guantanamo treaty. To recognize another government might put these rights in legal jeopardy. These are facts of some importance.

11. Why shouldn't we set up a NATO-like organization and command structure among the Caribbean countries who are most directly concerned with the Cuban threat?

It is true that there is deep concern among the Caribbean countries about the Cuban threat and some of them are reported to have expressed an interest in a NATO-like structure and organization.

Such an approach is necessarily based on the concept that the greatest need is for military force either to attack Cuba or to defend the Caribbean from Cuban attack. This is not the present situation. The real problem is subversion from within with the help of Communist money, propaganda, training and, in some cases, arms. It would be

unfortunate

unfortunate for the Caribbean governments to focus attention on treaty drafts, organization charts, US military assistance, chains of command and more rather than on the real problems of internal security which they face.

Moreover, the Rio Treaty constitutes, in effect, a hemisphere-wide NATO and within its multilateral obligations there is ample scope for collective action, if necessary, on a less than hemisphere-wide basis.

In addition it may be noted that the military power situation is in no way comparable to the NATO situation. In NATO the US is cooperating with partners located close to Soviet military power in a way which the US is not and having substantial military power of their own.

This does not exclude more informal cooperation among the Caribbean countries or between the US and individual Caribbean countries to deal with the problems of surveillance, of smuggling of arms and of internal security.

SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENTS TO CUBA

The following is the text of President Kennedy's statement, September 4, 1962 on Cuba.

"All Americans as well as all of our friends in this hemisphere have been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolster the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba.

"Information has reached this Government in the last four days from a variety of sources which established without doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a number of anti-aircraft defensive missiles with a slant range of twenty-five miles which are similar to early models of our Nike.

"Along with these missiles the Soviets are apparently providing the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required for their operation.

"We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles having a range of fifteen miles.

"The number of Soviet military technicians now known to be in Cuba or enroute -- approximately 3,500 -- is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment.

"As I stated last week we shall continue to make information available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.

"There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance.

"Were it to be otherwise the gravest issues would arise. The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the world-wide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt with as a part of that larger issue as well as in the context of the special relationships which have long characterized the inter-American system.

"It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere.

"The United States in conjunction with other Hemisphere countries will make sure that, while increased Cuban military expenditures will be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba, that, nevertheless, they will be nothing more."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
September 5, 1962

"The United States in conjunction with other Hemisphere countries will make sure that, while increased Cuban [illegible] will be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba, [illegible] the, will be nothing more."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
September 5, 1962

FORWARDED COPY FOLLOWS

AIR MAIL

STA

FOR RM USE ONLY

DA-3675

UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

TO : ALL ARA POSTS
ALL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS EUR, AF, NEA and FE

File

FROM : Department of State

DATE: [Oct 5, 1962]

SUBJECT: Background Information on Cuban Issues

REF :

The enclosed paper repeats many of the questions currently being asked about Cuban issues and provides in response helpful background information. It is believed that this review will be found of general interest.

All posts other than Moscow, Warsaw, Belgrade, Budapest, Sofia and Prague are authorized to use this information at their discretion in discussions of the Cuban situation with host governments.

BALL, ACTING

Enclosure:

Notes on Cuban Issues.

Box 43, SERIES B, MORSE PAPERS, VOL

1. Sources of background information.
2. How can we be sure equipment received is defensive?
3. Is the proposed fishing port a threatening military development?
4. Why would the Soviets want to raise this fuss in US - Soviet relations?
5. What are our NATO allies doing?
6. Is the Monroe Doctrine applicable?
7. What have we done about the Marxist-Lenist incursion into Cuba?
8. Why don't we invade Cuba?
9. Why not a peaceful blockade?
10. Why don't we recognize a government in exile?
11. Why shouldn't we set up a NATO-like organization and command structure among the Caribbean countries?

NOTES ON CUBAN ISSUES

1. The available facts on the build up in Cuba of Soviet arms have been covered in the President's statements and a Departmental paper on Soviet Military Aid to Cuba, copies of which are attached.

2. How can we be sure that this equipment is defensive and how will we know if an offensive capability is established?

The distinction between an offensive and defensive capability is not one which can be applied to individual weapons, almost any one of which can be used offensively. It has to do with the complex of available military power. It is a matter on which military men can make a reasonable judgment on the basis of known facts. In the case of Cuba, for example, an offensive capability would have to involve one or more of the following:

(a) A way to get substantial numbers of troops from here to there--namely, ships capable of taking troops from Cuba and landing them on a foreign shore against some opposition.

(b) An air striking force capable of penetrating defensive measures.

(c) Ground-to-ground missiles with a range permitting them to attack major areas of the continent.

One might also class as offensive the establishment of base complexes which would permit Soviet forces, as distinct from Cubans, to operate in strength from Cuban territory, or the build up of substantial Soviet bloc combat forces in Cuba.

All of these contingencies are foreseen in the Presidential statements as to the measures which would raise "grave issues" and imply some form of United States action.

It should always be clear that we are well informed about military developments in Cuba, and will know when any of these developments are underway.

Contrary to some reports the present SA-2 anti-aircraft missile bases cannot be converted in a short period of time

to

, -2-

to ground-to-ground ICBM bases. This would take completely new equipment and a number of months of work which could not be concealed.

It may also be worth noting with respect to the Soviet presence in Cuba, five other points:

(a) That in terms of numbers of Soviet bloc and Cuban military personnel and their equipment, there is no military threat to US.

(b) That the US still has more than ample power to prevent any aggressive military action against any Latin American country and has committed itself to use it if necessary.

(c) That the additional equipment now in Cuba or on the way adds very little to the difficulty of successful military operations against the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba if their further actions should indicate that this is required.

(d) That this is not the start of Soviet assistance to Cuba. Nearly 100 million of equipment was delivered in the 1960-1961 period, mostly conventional ground equipment, plus MIG aircraft.

(e) That the Soviet presence with military equipment in Cuba not only is no military threat to the US but is not the beginning of a possible Soviet threat to US security -- this was achieved some years ago when the Soviets secured a reasonably accurate ICBM with nuclear warheads and submarines with nuclear missiles and with ranges reaching to the US coastline.

3. Isn't the recent agreement between the Soviets and the Cubans for constructing a modern fishing port capable of serving the Cuban and Soviet Atlantic fishing fleets a threatening military development?

It is undoubtedly true that port facilities could be provided which would have value to the Soviets well beyond the needs of a fishing fleet alone. So far, since construction has not been started, we cannot know what the real intention is. But you may be sure that by the time it is completed we will know what its capability is and what it's being used for and will shape our policies accordingly.

4. Why

4. Why would the Soviets want to raise all this fuss in US-Soviet relations at this time by taking steps which they must have known would excite US hostility?

While one can never know for sure what motivates another person, least of all a Russian, the available evidence suggests strongly that this crash build up of military and economic assistance did not represent a Soviet initiative but rather a response to insistent demands from Castro for help. Sometime last spring Castro must have seen that his difficult economic situation was causing unrest in Cuba and seriously hampering his subversive activities in Latin America. He apparently feared that the United States might take advantage of those internal difficulties to invade Cuba. In any case a major addition to his defenses would both impress Cubans with the supposed reality of the threat of invasion and reassure his supporters that defense was possible. His position would thus be bolstered until expanded Soviet economic aid and technical advice got his economy going up again.

The Soviet Union was undoubtedly most reluctant to see the Cuban regime get into deep trouble. The association was already close enough for the overthrow of Castro to be interpreted globally as a major Soviet reversal. Probably more important, Cuba was a major asset to the Soviet Union in its long term and massive effort to convert other Latin American countries to Communism. Therefore Castro's position must be supported or at least prevented from deteriorating and at least his minimum demands met.

This was perhaps not an easy decision for Mr. K. His economic position is under pressure from many quarters and further demands from Cuba could hardly be welcome. The Soviet military must have known as clearly as our own that what they were providing in terms of defensive equipment really added very little to Castro's ability to withstand determined US defensive military action. The Soviets have had enough experience in Latin America to be aware that this further dramatic identification of Castro with the Soviet bloc could only damage their program of subversion by alienating fellow travelers and liberals who still saw Castro as a Latin revolutionist or agrarian reformer, rather than an agent of Soviet imperialism and by further alerting and consolidating the opposition of truly democratic sectors of the population.

This

-4-

This analysis of Soviet motives and objectives is an important guide to US policy for in the context of the global struggle, such as we are now engaged in with the Soviet bloc, the essential issue with respect to Cuba is not Cuba itself but Cuba as an aid to Soviet objectives.

From this standpoint it seems clear that, while the recent Soviet moves have been defensive from a military standpoint, they do represent an effort to maintain, if not improve, the ability of the Soviet bloc to utilize Cuba to act offensively in the subversive field against the governments of Latin America.

It, therefore, must be the aim of US policy and that of our friends in the Hemisphere to do everything we can to demonstrate to the Soviets that their investment in Cuba will not pay off. This can be done by rigorous measures which isolate Cuba from the rest of the Hemisphere, by vigorous action against Castro's Communist agents and collaborators within the countries of Latin America and by continued active promotion of the Alliance for Progress as the free world's answer to the problems of the peoples of Latin America.

At the same time that we attempt to minimize the value of Cuba to the Soviet Union, we wish also to do what we can to increase its cost to them. This is the reason for seeking cooperation from other free world countries in Latin America and elsewhere in connection with trade and shipping questions.

5. Isn't it intolerable that our NATO allies, for whom we have done so much, should permit their ships to help the Soviets supply Cuba with the things Cuba needs, including military equipment?

The US Government has been unable to produce a single bit of evidence that any free world ship on charter to the Soviet bloc has carried military equipment or supplies from the Soviet bloc to Cuba. Nor are any of our free world friends selling military equipment or supplies themselves to Cuba.

In fact the Soviets are, of course, extraordinarily secretive about military matters and it seems highly unlikely that they would ever agree to the shipment of military equipment in vessels manned by other than Soviet bloc crews as are all those now under charter to the bloc.

The

-5-

The free world ships which have been chartered to the Soviet bloc for use in Cuban trade have been engaged primarily in carrying such things as oil, fertilizers, machinery and equipment and various types of consumer goods to Cuba and carrying sugar away from Cuba.

The general practice is to charter such ships with owners crews without specifying what routes they may be used on. To specify that they not be used on bloc routes to Cuba will cause the Soviets some complications but no serious damage as the Soviet bloc owns far more tonnage than is required to handle the totality of the Cuban trade.

It would, of course, be possible to refuse to charter any vessels to the Soviet bloc for any trade routes whatever. This would be seriously embarrassing to their trade until they had completed the massive ship building program which they would undoubtedly undertake. It would be extremely difficult to secure cooperation from all free world countries to such an embargo, particularly in view of the great surplus of shipping which currently exists in the world. It would be hard to persuade companies or countries that the provision of ship services was essentially different in character from the provision of goods of a wide variety of types which is currently accepted as part of our trading relationships with the bloc.

6. Is there still such a thing as the Monroe Doctrine or have we thrown it on the scrap heap?

The Monroe Doctrine states a conclusion, namely, that the incursion of a European power into the hemisphere constitutes a "danger to the peace and security of this nation." It does not specify the action to be taken in the face of a particular situation and in fact the actions that have been taken over the 140 years since it was announced have varied widely. Implementation of any principle must depend upon judgments embracing all the current circumstances and factors in the situation in relation to the fundamental security interests of the United States, which the conclusion or principle is of course, intended to reflect.

It is true that the Monroe Doctrine, starting in 1939 with the Inter-American Conference at Havana, has been made part of the doctrine of the Inter-American system. But this in no way makes it any less a United States doctrine to be applied in relation to US security interests. The multi-lateralizing of the Doctrine provides an alternative channel

for

for taking whatever actions appear appropriate to make it effective. It in no way limits our own ability to take those actions which are essential to our own national security on a unilateral basis.

The actions of the US Government from 1960 on have reflected a recognition of the fact that the Castro Communist regime in Cuba was a danger to the peace and security of the US and the hemisphere, though thus far this danger has not seemed in our best judgment to be of a character which warranted military action.

7. What have we in fact done about the Marxist-Leninist incursion into Cuba and thereby into this hemisphere?

Here are the major steps which have been taken:

(a) Diplomatic relations have been broken.

(b) All imports of goods into the US from Cuba or from other countries containing Cuban components have been stopped.

(c) Exports to Cuba have been limited to certain foods and medicines.

(d) The use of US registered vessels to carry military equipment and supplies and other strategic materials to Cuba has been forbidden.

(e) In agreement with our Inter-American friends, we have:

(i) Forbidden the export of military equipment and material to Cuba.

(ii) We have excluded Cuba from participating in all the organizations of the Inter-American system operating under the Organization of American States.

(iii) We have excluded Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board.

(iv) We have requested the CCAS as the supreme body of the OAS in constant session, to maintain special vigilance and have established a Special Consultative Committee on Security to investigate and make recommendations for action at the request of any Latin American country on attempts by Cuba to subvert their governments by any means.

(v) In

(v) In precise terms we have declared a Marxist-Leninist government incompatible with all the hemisphere stands for and have identified Cuba unanimously as such a government.

(vi) Apart from these specific steps, we remain convinced that the welfare of the CAR's, as well as their best defense vs. the efforts of the Soviet bloc to subvert them to the doctrines of communism lies in strengthening the institutions of political and economic democracy in the hemisphere. We have therefore embarked, together with the CAR on the Alliance for Progress - a decade of development which offers the hope of bringing to the peoples of the hemisphere the equalization of economic benefits and the democratic institutions which are compatible with their individual dignity and which fulfill their basic needs.

(vii) We have maintained the closest surveillance from international waters and airspace of everything that goes into and out of Cuba.

(viii) We have undertaken a wide variety of bilateral measures with other Latin American countries to improve their capability to deal with Communist subversion.

(ix) We have welcomed tens of thousands of Cuban exiles to our shores, provided them with subsistence, helped them find jobs, welcomed them into our armed forces and given encouragement to them and the people of Cuba in their desire to restore free government in that country.

8. Why don't we invade Cuba and get it over with?

In the first place our best military judgment is that an invasion of Cuba would cost many American and Cuban lives. Even if there were no other reasons, this alone would make it necessary that we seek a solution to this problem not requiring the use of force, though always accepting that in the end force may be necessary, as the President has done.

In addition, under present circumstances, it would be exceedingly difficult to justify military action as consistent with the pattern of international law and relations which the US for many years has fought for, calling for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. We could be in serious difficulties not only in the United Nations but elsewhere. For with our pattern of alliances involving our relations with the Soviet Union, unilateral action by the

United States

-2-

United States against Cuba would inevitably complicate other aspects of our relations and those of our allies with the Soviets.

In fact we must realize that it is Soviet interest and prestige with which we are dealing in Cuba and not just Castro and the Cubans and, therefore, action of this sort with respect to Cuba can only be taken aftermost careful appraisal of probable Soviet reactions there and elsewhere around the world where we are in conflict.

If, as the President has said, United States security interests were to be directly and immediately threatened, then we would have to act, regardless of its complications elsewhere, but under present circumstances such risks are not justified.

9. Why not a peaceful blockade then?

There is really no such thing as a peaceful blockade. Whether it is peaceful or not depends upon what the other party decides. For generations the United States has pressed hard and in some cases fought for a concept of freedom of the seas which might at the most permit us to interfere with Cuban ships on the basis of a doctrine of equivalent reprisal without providing a basis for charges of illegal action. And, of course, stopping Cuban ships alone would accomplish almost nothing.

To be effective a blockade requires that we stop Soviet ships, by force if necessary. This would be an act of war. A blockade by the US could only be justified if we were prepared to make it effective even though that involved starting a military conflict.

This is not to say a blockade is excluded but that it is an appropriate instrument only in connection with new and different actions in Cuba or elsewhere which call for warlike measures. It, therefore, can be justified only where the use of military force could be defended.

10. Why don't we recognize a government in exile to which we could give military assistance and other support in regaining Cuba?

This is an idea which has many attractions but also raises many difficulties. There are over 200 Cuban exile groups and to find a government which could unite the

majority

majority of the exiles behind them would be an enormous practical task. Even if true, there is no prospect that Cubans alone could conduct a military operation against Cuba with our equipment and training help that would have a reasonable prospect of success under anything like present circumstances.'

There are also legal and practical difficulties about recognizing a government in-exile based on the refugees and disregarding the Cubans in Cuba who are fighting Castro, thousands of whom are in jail. It has been US policy consistently to recognize governments in exile only when they have a direct connection with the last legally constituted government of the country, usually when they have actually exercised power in the country just prior to being forced out. This is a legal position which we would be reluctant to abandon.

But it would be even more serious to give the people of Cuba who have stayed behind to fight Castro directly the idea that they have no role to play in determining how Cuba will be governed. In them must lie a major share of responsibility for returning Cuba to the free world.

There is a final legal point which is that while we have broken diplomatic relations with the present Cuban Government, we still recognize it as the Cuban Government and as such responsible for its international obligations, including protection of American citizens and recognition of our rights under the Guantanamo treaty. To recognize another government might put these rights in legal jeopardy. These are facts of some importance.

11. Why shouldn't we set up a NATO-like organization and command structure among the Caribbean countries who are most directly concerned with the Cuban threat?

It is true that there is deep concern among the Caribbean countries about the Cuban threat and some of them are reported to have expressed an interest in a NATO-like structure and organization.

Such an approach is necessarily based on the concept that the greatest need is for military force either to attack Cuba or to defend the Caribbean from Cuban attack. This is not the present situation. The real problem is subversion from within with the help of Communist money, propaganda, training and, in some cases, arms. It would be

unfortunate

-10-

unfortunate for the Caribbean governments to focus attention on treaty drafts, organization charts, US military assistance, chains of command and more rather than on the real problems of internal security which they face.

Moreover, the Rio Treaty constitutes, in effect, a hemisphere-wide NATO and within its multilateral obligations there is ample scope for collective action, if necessary, on a less than hemisphere-wide basis.

In addition it may be noted that the military power situation is in no way comparable to the NATO situation. In NATO the US is cooperating with partners located close to Soviet military power in a way which the US is not and having substantial military power of their own.

This does not exclude more informal cooperation among the Caribbean countries or between the US and individual Caribbean countries to deal with the problems of surveillance, of smuggling of arms and of internal security.

Enclosures:

1. President's Statement of September 4, 1962.
2. President's Statement of September 13, 1962.
3. Departmental Paper on Soviet Military Aid to Cuba.

RECEIVED
SEP 13 1962
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR THE AMERICAS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR THE AMERICAS